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Legislative Program Review and Investigations  
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**Submitted by:**

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*Sister and guardian of Thomas Dwyer, a resident of Southbury Training School*

Thank you very much for affording me the opportunity to speak at this hearing. I am addressing the need for ICFs/MR (Intermediate Care Facilities for Persons with Mental Retardation – a federal Medicaid program with federal standards and oversight). ICFs/MR provide care to people with severe intellectual and developmental/disabilities (formerly, “mental retardation”).

Please note that the word “choice” and the term “based on the level of need of the consumer” are included in the mandate of this committee.

Most of the residents of Southbury Training School are severely disabled, suffering from intellectual, physical, and medical disabilities. STS offers an array of services that are crucial to the well-being of this population. They include 24/7 on-site medical staff, a health care unit that enables individuals to receive care that would otherwise be available only in a hospital or nursing home, staff psychiatrists who are familiar with the history of each resident, an experienced staff with minimal turnover and a dental clinic with experience treating this population that serves the residents of STS and over 500 people who live in the community or at home.

A number of these services simply cannot be provided in the community; others would be prohibitively expensive. If Connecticut is to provide adequate services to this population, it can do so most efficiently and cost effectively in a licensed congregate setting (e.g., STS).

Furthermore, there are many well-known problems with many private-provider community facilities.

Their staff is generally not trained and is paid low wages and turnover is high. That means staff often does not have the expertise to provide proper care and residents do not enjoy long-term relationships with their care-givers. My brother's roommate at STS for approximately 20 years died 27 days after he moved into the community – he choked to death because there was not enough staff at the facility he moved to and because the one staff person there had essentially no experience. There are people at Southbury Training School who work with my brother who have known him for 10-20 years. They know what he needs and how to deal with him. For someone who does not speak and barely communicates, working with people who are familiar is crucial. The same is true of most other STS residents.

Psychiatric care for residents of community facilities is generally provided at clinics or training hospitals where there is also high turnover in staff.

Last, ICF's/MR are required to be inspected by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. These inspections are rigorous and ensure quality of care. Community facilities are not held to comparable standards.

STS has been closed to new admissions since 1986. Regional centers are severely limited by their size. This means that Connecticut's disabled population does not have a choice between congregate and community-based care. Choice is mandated by federal law and by the Supreme Court's Olmstead decision. Many residents of Connecticut who are severely disabled and live at home (many of whom are on the waiting list) and many residents of community facilities who will become more disabled or age, will need the type of care provided only in congregate facilities. This population is not being properly served. The needs of these people should be addressed by providing more, not less, congregate care in Connecticut, **including by admitting additional residents to STS**. As is clear from Mr. Kassel's presentation, that would in fact reduce costs.

## **ABUSE, NEGLECT AND DEATH IN COMMUNITY SETTINGS<sup>1</sup>**

### **Connecticut**

**Hartford Courant, June 12, 2006**

#### **Agency criticizes agency responsible for mentally retarded**

A state agency, reviewing deaths of mentally retarded clients, is critical of the quality of health services provided by the state Department of Mental Retardation. The Fatality Review Board for Persons with Disabilities has concluded that the DMR contributed to the deaths of dozens of mentally retarded people in its care because it failed to provide them with adequate health care services. The report, released Friday, pointed to what it said were key weaknesses in the DMR's health care services including inadequate coordination of services for people living in the community, the discharge of hospital patients into shoddy nursing homes and insufficient nursing care. The report summarizes the board's review of DMR client deaths from July 2003 through June 2005. The board reviewed the deaths of 361 clients, ranging from people who live in state institutions to those living independently or with family, and conducted 35 in-depth investigations. The board found abuse or neglect in many of the cases. The mental retardation agency is reviewing the findings of the board and plans to use them to enhance the agency's existing efforts to improve its health and safety programs, according to a statement the DMR released Friday. It said it has already enacted some of the board's previous recommendations.

### **Connecticut**

**The Hartford Courant, January 4, 2003**

#### **Study: DMR Clients Died Needlessly**

A legislative committee has concluded that some mentally retarded residents of group homes in Connecticut needlessly died —tragic|| deaths, which were then not investigated properly because poor oversight by state agencies. In a voluminous report on group home deaths, the Program Review and Investigations Committee also found that the state Department of Mental Retardation created a conflict of interest by investigating deaths itself, and said it should transfer that responsibility to another state agency. The legislature late last year asked the committee to review deaths in DMR group homes after a Courant investigation found evidence of neglect, staff error or other questionable circumstances in one out of every 10 deaths over the past decade. As part of the lengthy report, the committee reviewed the 36 cases identified by The Courant and 177 others chosen randomly to see if there were any patterns of neglect. The committee report concluded: —Tragic things happened that but for a different set of circumstances might not have.|| It also pointed out that systems were in place to address the risks to DMR clients, but for one reason or another were not carried out.

### **Connecticut**

**Hartford Courant, December 2-4, 2001**

#### **Fatal Errors, Secret Deaths**

Despite a history of official insistence that untimely deaths are virtually nonexistent in Connecticut's 774 group homes for people with mental retardation, a *Hartford Courant* investigation of group homes found evidence of neglect, staff error and other questionable

circumstances in one out of every 10 deaths over the past decade. The series spans five articles, including —The Toll: Suffocation, Drowning, Choking and Burns,||—How did they die? The State Won't Say,||and —Lawmakers Call for Inquiry into DMR.||

## **Connecticut**

**The Connecticut Post, December 22, 2000**

### **Group homes need uniform safety rules**

Advocates for the disabled and the State Department of Mental Retardation want to know whether two drownings at Connecticut group homes for people with mental retardation, being similar and occurring close together, indicate a widespread problem. The Department of Mental Retardation will investigate whether the drownings were isolated incidents or part of a pattern of neglect.

## **California**

**California Department of Developmental Services (DDS), October 27, 2004**  
**California Releases Mortality Studies**

During the late 1990s, a series of epidemiological studies of death rates in California mental retardation institutions compared community residential settings was issued by the University of California Riverside. These reports found risk of mortality to be up to 83% higher in community settings than in institutions (see, <http://www.lifeexpectancy.com>, link Articles, Comparative Mortality). These studies prompted the California Department of Developmental Services to commission two follow-up studies. Comparing quality of care provided by developmental centers, community care facilities, intermediate care facilities and other settings, the report indicates, —there were few statistically significant differences in the quality of care, —though it was noted that the developmental centers provided a \_igher quality of care. • ||One problem in determining the adequacy of health care for this study was the lack of documentation. Except for developmental centers, the lack of documentation was an issue for all other types of facilities. Another issue pointed out by the authors of the report is the need for health education appropriately geared for the developmental level of the consumer. An earlier report (1994) noted that —residents at developmental centers were significantly less likely to die from preventable causes than those residing [in] skilled nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities, or community care facilities.||The preventable deaths were primarily due to —inadequacies in the quality of care||followed by —inadequacies in the medical management of common health concerns.

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<sup>1</sup> These examples are taken from the website of VOR, a national organization that seeks to unite advocates, educate and assist families, organizations, public officials, and individuals concerned with the quality of life and choice for persons with intellectual disabilities within a full array of residential options, including community and facility-based care. See <http://vor.net/images/AbuseandNeglect.pdf>.

## Deinstitutionalization in California: Mortality of Persons with Developmental Disabilities after Transfer into Community Care, 1997-1999

Robert Shavelle, David Strauss and Steven Day  
*Life Expectancy Project*

**Abstract:** More than 2,000 persons with developmental disability transferred from California institutions into community care during 1993 to early 1996. Using data on 1,878 children and adults moved between April 1, 1993 and March 5, 1996, Strauss, Shavelle, Baumeister and Anderson (1998) found a corresponding increase in mortality rates by comparison with those who stayed behind. Shavelle and Strauss (1999) updated the study through 1996 and found similar results. The present study is a further update through 1999. There were 81 deaths, a 47% increase in risk-adjusted mortality over that expected in institutions ( $p < 0.01$ ). As in the two previous studies, we found that persons transferred later were at higher risk than those moving earlier, even after adjustment for differences in risk profiles. The difference cannot be explained by the short-term effects of the transfer, and therefore appear to reflect an increased mortality rate associated with the less intensive medical care and supervision available in the community.

**Key words:** Community care, developmentally disabled, epidemiology, excess death rate, institutions, mortality, standardized mortality ratio.

### 1. Introduction

Budgetary constraints in the United States in general, and California in particular, have forced a re-examination of policies for caring for the developmentally disabled. Many states in the U.S. now have waiting lists for services, and only limited offerings once service is established. California is unique in that care for the developmentally disabled is an entitlement, mandated by the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act of 1969. The Act guarantees people with developmental disabilities the right to the services and supports they need to live like people without disabilities (Department of Developmental Services, 2001). A developmental disability is defined by the State of California as a condition arising prior to age 18, which is permanent and will affect the child's ability to care for himself/herself. Examples include cerebral palsy, autism, down syndrome and mental retardation.

Deinstitutionalization is a sensitive issue, with attendant philosophical and political considerations. It is often difficult to discuss the topic without emotional opinions being voiced and dogmatically defended. Because it can involve life or death, and extensive public and private financial resources, however, it is a necessary topic of discussion and inquiry.

California carried out a major deinstitutionalization during 1993-1996, with more than 2,000 children and adults with developmental disability transferred from state facilities to community care. Most were relocated to private group homes. Strauss, Shavelle, Baumeister and Anderson (1998) — hereafter, SSBA — analyzed the mortality experience of a group of 1,878 of these movers. There were 45 deaths in their April 1, 1993 to February 14, 1996 study period. This represented a 51% increase in mortality, relative to that of comparable persons living in state institutions. Subsequently, Strauss, Anderson, Shavelle, Sheridan and Trenkle (1998) reported on the causes of death, using information from the death certificates. Most recently Shavelle and Strauss (1999) — hereafter, S&S — analyzed 1996 mortality and found an excess mortality of 88%.

Investigation of the outcomes of deinstitutionalization has continued in recent years (Crichton, 1998; Stancliffe and Abery, 1997; Stancliffe and Hayden, 1998), but work on health-related outcomes remains limited. Mortality is one important measure of quality of health care, and has the advantage of being simple and unambiguous to measure (SSBA). Here we summarize of the mortality experience in 1997 to 1999 of the same group of subjects analyzed by SSBA and S&S, using the same methods. Our aim was to see whether the results in the earlier works held true over the more recent period. This study may shed further light on the issue because the subjects are free of the extra early mortality described as the “dislocation of moving” effect.

## 2. Methods

There were 1,776 subjects in the study at the beginning of 1997, the 1,812 considered by S&S less 36 who died in 1996. All movers left a state institution between April 1, 1993 and March 5, 1996. For the profile of the original 1,878 subjects with respect to functional skills, type of community residence, and other characteristics, see SSBA. The risk factors used for statistical adjustment were age, gender, mobility and self-care skills. SSBA described how these were measured. Deaths were found by matching the Client Development Evaluation Report (CDER; California Department of Developmental Services, 1986) data base with 1997-1999 mortality information from the California Department of Health Services (1999). The statistical methodology here was the same as that of SSBA and S&S. Briefly, we:

a. Used previous research that identified the factors related to survival of persons with developmental disabilities. In addition to the usual factors of age and sex, these were feeding and mobility skills (SSBA, S&S).

b. Used information on the factors to develop a logistic regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989) model to predict the probability of death given various patient characteristics.

c. Applied the model to the children and adults recently moved from institutions as follows: For each person calculate his/her "exposure time", the time in months from the beginning of the observation period to the earlier of (i) the end of the study period, or (ii) death.

d. Calculated each person's expected chance of death by multiplying the probability computed in (b) by their exposure time computed in (c). The sum of these values over various groups were the expected numbers of deaths.

A fuller description of the methods is given in SSBA and S&S.

### 3. Results

Of the group of 1776 subjects, 81 died in the 1997-1999 study period. Table 1 shows the numbers of deaths, number of person-years at risk, and mortality rate, both on an aggregate basis and broken down by year of move. The year-specific mortality rates show an increasing trend. In part, this reflects the fact that the highest functioning individuals tended to transfer first (details not shown here).

Table 1: Mortality Rates in 1997-1999 for 1993-1996 movers.

| Group                      | Number of deaths | Total person-years<br>at risk <sup>a</sup> | Mortality rate <sup>b</sup> |
|----------------------------|------------------|--|-----------------------------|
| 1993 movers                | 14               | 1331.6                                     | 10.5                        |
| 1994 movers                | 27               | 1682.5                                     | 16.1                        |
| 1995/6 movers <sup>c</sup> | 40               | 2201.0                                     | 18.2                        |
| All movers                 | 81               | 5215.1                                     | 15.5                        |

<sup>a</sup>Total time between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 1999 (or until death of client) for the 1,776 movers.

<sup>b</sup>Number of deaths per 1,000 person-years.

<sup>c</sup>Because there were only 7 deaths to the group who moved in early 1996, this group was combined with the 1995 movers.

In Table 2 we compare the numbers of deaths to the expected number for comparable persons residing in institutions, taking account of age, gender, and functional skills. The ratio of the two is a standardized mortality ratio (SMR).

The 81 deaths corresponds to an SMR of 1.47, i.e., a 47% increase over what would be expected ( $p < 0.01$ ; 95% confidence interval 1.15 to 1.78).

Table 2: Comparison of movers with the institutional population in 1997-99<sup>a</sup>.

| Group                      | Expected mortality rate <sup>b</sup> | Standardized mortality ratio (SMR) <sup>c</sup> | 95% confidence interval for SMR <sup>d</sup> |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| 1993 movers                | 10.3                                 | 1.02  | (0.49,1.55)                                  |
| 1994 movers                | 10.1                                 | 1.55  | (0.99,2.18)                                  |
| 1995/6 movers <sup>e</sup> | 11.2                                 | 1.63*   | (1.12,2.14)                                  |
| All movers                 | 10.6                                 | 1.47**  | (1.15,1.78)                                  |

<sup>a</sup>Based on data on all persons residing in state institutions at any time between January 1, 1987 and December 31, 1993.

<sup>b</sup>Expected number of deaths ( $\times 1,000$ ) based on the Poisson model, divided by the number of person-years at risk.

<sup>c</sup>The ratio of the observed number of deaths to the expected number based on the Poisson model.

<sup>d</sup>Computed as  $SMR + 1.96 \cdot (SMR/E)^{0.5}$ , where E is the expected number of deaths (Kahn and Sempos, 1989, p.101).

<sup>e</sup>Because there were only 7 deaths to the group who moved in early 1996, this group was combined with the 1995 movers.

\*Significantly different from 1.0 at  $p < 0.05$ .

\*\*Significantly different from 1.0 at  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 2 shows that the SMRs tend to be larger for the persons who transferred in the later years. Note that this trend has remained even after adjustment for risk factors (age, gender, and skills). The same trend was observed by SSBA and S&S for deaths in the earlier study periods.

The trend of increased death rates for persons who transferred later was likely due to those moving later having additional medical conditions or being more frail. Indeed it is reasonable to expect that those moved earlier would have been the most qualified and/or most willing to move. In addition, earlier movers may, if anything, be healthier than their data alone would indicate; that is, the available data may not fully capture the individual's mortality risk. Frailty, while a useful medical concept, is not explicitly available on the data base, and thus was not a variable in the logistic model.

In Table 3 we stratified the data (both deaths and person-years of exposure) into four groups on the basis of mobility and the use of a feeding tube. In contrast to the previous two studies (SSBA and S&S), the SMRs here were rather similar. Conversely, the excess death rates (EDRs) decreased sharply with increasing



functional ability. For example, the EDR was 36.5 per 1000 for group 1 (that is, 36.5 extra deaths per year for every 1000 persons), but only 3.1 extra deaths per 1000 for group 4.

Table 3: Observed and expected numbers of deaths in 1997-1999 among the movers, stratified by level of functioning.

|  | 1    | 2    | 3     | 4     | Total |
|--|------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Observed deaths                                  | 7    | 11   | 37    | 26    | 81    |
| Expected number <sup>a</sup>                     | 4.88 | 9.03 | 24.84 | 16.54 | 55.29 |
| Standardized mortality ratio (SMR) <sup>b</sup>  | 1.43 | 1.22 | 1.49  | 1.57  | 1.47  |
| Difference of mortality rates (EDR) <sup>c</sup> | 36.5 | 10.0 | 6.5   | 3.1   | 4.9   |

<sup>a</sup>Expected numbers are on the basis of institutional rates for comparable subjects.

<sup>b</sup>Observed divided by expected number.

<sup>c</sup>Observed mortality rate less expected mortality rate, per 1000 person-years.

1 = Persons tube fed and with no motor skills (does not lift head; no hand or arm use; does not crawl, creep or scoot; does not walk)

2 = Persons either tube fed and with some motor skills, or not tube fed and lacking motor skills.

3 = Persons not tube fed and with some, but not all, motor skills.

4 = Persons not tube fed and with full motor skills (walks well alone).

As in S&S we also compared the observed number of deaths in **institutions** with the expected number according to the model used. These were 251 and 260.46. Thus, as in the previous study, the model predicted the number of institution deaths with considerable accuracy. This may increase confidence in the validity of the model-based comparisons reported here.

Underlying **causes of death** from the California Department of Health Services are shown in Table 4. The data are provided in the form of computerized numerical codes according to the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth revision (Context Software Systems, 1995). There were 6 deaths due to cancer, compared to 4 of the 36 deaths reported in S&S and 0 of the 45 reported in SSBA. This is consistent with SSBA's hypothesis that the earlier selected movers tended to be the healthiest available at the time of moving. There were 17 deaths due to pneumonia, only 1 of which was aspiration pneumonia; previously S&S found 4 of their 8 pneumonia to be aspiration pneumonia. There were 5 externally-caused deaths, including 1 drowning and 2 homicides.

Table 4: Causes of deaths 1997-1999 (number of deaths in this category).

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|  |
|--|
| Viral infection (1)  |
| Cancer of esophagus (1), larynx (1), ovary (1), kidney (1), or other (2)   |
| Other metabolic disorder (1)   |
| Mental retardation (5)   |
| Other cerebral degeneration (1), or parkinsons (1)   |
| Infantile cerebral palsy (7)   |
| Epileptic seizure (2)  |
| Other conditions of brain (2), central nervous system (1),<br>or peripheral nervous system (1)                     |
| Hypertensive renal disease (1)   |
| Acute myocardial infarction (2), or other ischemic heart disease (5)   |
| Other heart disease (6)  |
| Pneumococcal pneumonia (2), other bacterial pneumonia (1),<br>bronchopneumonia (3), or pneumonia, unspecified (10) |
| Influenza (1), chronic airway obstruction (2), or aspiration pneumonia (1)   |
| Disease of esophagus (1), gastric ulcer (1), duodenal ulcer (1),<br>or other digestive disorder (3)                |
| Other urinary system disorder (1)  |
| Other congenital anomaly of heart (1)  |
| Other congenital anomaly (2)   |
| Convulsion (1)   |
| Unknown (2)  |
| Other and unspecified fall (2)   |
| Accidental drowning (1)  |
| Homicide by stabbing (1), or by legal intervention (gunshot) of police (1)   |

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#### 4. Discussion

Overall, the community death rate was 47% higher than expected for comparable persons living in institutions. This figure is lower than the 88% reported by S&S – which may have been due to a temporary overload of the community care system from the rapid deinstitutionalization — but similar to the 51% of SSBA. The differences between the excess death rates in the three studies were not statistically significant. Reasons for the lower mortality rates in institutions compared to other residence types have been suggested (Strauss and Kastner, 1996). These include: continuity of care, centralized record keeping, and immediate access to medical care.

As all movers had already been living the community for at least 9 months

prior to 1997, their excess mortality cannot be ascribed to short-term relocation effects. We therefore did not analyze mortality in terms of time since transfer.

There is evidence that these results are not artifacts of the model chosen. Firstly, the model-based expected numbers of deaths were very similar under a wide choice of plausible models (see SSBA). Secondly, as noted, the observed number of deaths for persons **remaining in the institutions** was close to its model-based expected value.

The methods used here are applicable to a wide range of social and policy issues. The approach is to compare observed and expected values, where the expected values are computed from a model calibrated to past, present or optimal experience. Applications could include the effects of:

- a. Variation in prison inmate reform measures on rates of residivism,
- b. Experimentation with welfare payments and work requirements on subsequent financial status, or
- c. Improved teacher training or incentives on student performance.

This is by no means an exhaustive list, and the reader will undoubtedly by now have mentally compiled his/her own list of (i) past social or policy issues that should have been more appropriately studied prior to widespread implementation, or (ii) future areas in need of study. Indeed a careful analysis of potential outcomes, costs and benefits, while given appropriate mention in the planning and "public hearing" stages of policy boards, is often the first casualty of partisanship, budget cuts, and expediency. This is unfortunate, given today's often abundance of data, lightning-fast computers, and qualified personnel to perform the analyses.

Given the higher mortality rates outside institutions, it might be asked why deinstitutionalization was considered, implemented, and continues to this day. Among other reasons — we attempt to avoid political issues here — major factors include the long history of this movement, the fact that the evidence about increased mortality has only recently emerged, and increasing financial pressures on public agencies. We address each of these in turn.

The deinstitutionalization movement began many years ago, at the same time as efforts to "mainstream" the mentally ill. The 1962 book by Ken Kessey, "One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest", and the 1975 film with Jack Nicholson based on it, helped shape the public's view of mental institutions. In the U.S. in the 1960's, institutions were disparaged as "snake pits" and thought to offer little benefit to patients. A recent book by Michael D'Antonio (2004) describes the "dark era of institutionalization" in the 1940's and 1950's. The author chronicles a history of injustice and poor care at the Fernald School in Massachusetts, home to "the feeble-minded and disabled." The school was forced to change only after lawsuits mandated improved care and the development of community programs. Medical

care, patient rights, and social justice have since advanced quite substantially in the U.S., no doubt a result of similar parent advocacy and lawsuits.

The deinstitutionalization movement in California began prior to any long-term studies of health outcomes. Only later did studies show increased mortality (SSBA; Strauss, Anderson, Shavelle, Sheridan and Trenkle, 1998; Strauss and Shavelle, 1997; Strauss and Shavelle, 1998; Strauss, Kastner and Shavelle, 1998; Strauss, Shavelle, Anderson and Baumeister, 1998; S&S; Strauss and Kastner, 1996; Strauss, Eyman and Grossman, 1996). By then the movement was in full swing, and — due to large fixed and opportunity costs — the per patient costs in the depleted institutions were even higher.

Deinstitutionalization was one putative way to cut costs, at least temporarily. The current fiscal situation in California, however, is now worse than when deinstitutionalization began in 1993. Services to the DD population have already been cut, and patient co-payments increased. This trend will undoubtedly continue, as the state must find ways to cut costs in order to comply with the entitlements guaranteed by The Lanterman Act.

Cost may be one drawback of institutional care (though the total cost to society of community living is difficult to assess). Another consideration is that children and adults are not integrated into society as a whole. The Lanterman Act grants clients the right to receive services in the least restrictive environment; that is, a place close to the parents' home community where others without disabilities also receive their services. The services here include medical care and, most recently, living accommodations. There is an analogous law governing education of the disabled in the United States. This is "The Education For All Handicapped Children Act", Public Law 94-142. According to PL 94-142 all handicapped children must be provided with educational services in the least restrictive environment; this is called "mainstreaming" as it mandates that the disabled be educated as closely as possible to their non-handicapped peers. But movement from large group care facilities to community care is not always the best choice. Voice of the Retarded, a U.S. organization that advocates for the disabled, is now "fighting to prevent another failed experiment at Fernald [the facility cited above]: namely, the relocation of 275 adult and elderly people with mental retardation who will give up familiar staff, peers and physical environment without the capacity to understand or talk about any of those losses. We believe the risks of these forced relocations far exceed the benefits to our family members" (Voice of the Retarded, 2004).

The results in this and previous studies indicate an increased mortality rate, above that which would be expected. The cost savings of deinstitutionalization and social value of integration must be balanced against this increased risk.

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# Home and Community Based Services Waivers: An overview

The Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) waiver program was established in 1981 as part of Medicaid in the Social Security Act (1915(c)). Under the HCBS waiver program, states can elect to furnish a broad array of services (excluding room and board) that may or may not be otherwise covered by Medicaid, including case management, homemaker, home health aide, personal care, adult day health care, habilitation, and respite services. States can request permission to offer additional services. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) must grant approval of all waiver applications. The intent of the waiver is to give states the flexibility to develop and implement alternatives to institutional care for eligible populations. Eligible populations include Medicaid-eligible elderly and disabled persons, physically disabled, persons with developmental disabilities or mental retardation, or mental illness. Individuals must be shown to be eligible for institutional services (such as an Intermediate Care Facility for Persons with Mental Retardation (ICFs/MR) to be eligible for HCBS. (Source: Duckett, M.J. & Guy, M.R., *HCBS Waiver*, Health Care Financing Review (Fall 2000). Vol. 22, Number 1, pp 123-125).

## Quality Assurance: ICF/MR and HCBS Compared

| ICF/MR   | HCBS   |
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| <p>To be federally certified, ICFs/MR must meet 8 conditions of participation: (CoPs): Management; Client Protections; Facility Staffing; Active Treatment; Client Behavior and Facility Practices; Health Care Services; Physical Environment; and Dietetic Services. The eight CoPs comprise 378 specific standards and elements.</p> <p>State surveyors conduct annual onsite reviews. CMS is currently conducting “look behind” surveys of every state and private ICFs/MR to “double check” the state surveyors’ findings. Serious deficiencies must be corrected within 90 days; other deficiencies must be corrected within a year. Failure to correct deficiencies results in loss of certification and loss of Medicaid funding.</p> <p>The Department of Justice (DOJ) also has a role in overseeing public (not private) ICFs/MR. DOJ does not have jurisdiction over community programs.</p> | <p>Although there is no standard HCBS program, all are required to provide CMS with the following assurances, as a condition of waiver approval: health and welfare of waiver participants; plans of care responsive to waiver participant needs; only qualified waiver providers; State eligibility assessment includes need for institutionalization; State Medicaid Agency retains administrative authority; and the State provides financial accountability (<b>the waiver must cost less than the institutional program</b>).</p> <p>HCBS waivers are reviewed every 3-5 years. Earlier this year, CMS refined its method of quality oversight, initiated with the release of <i>The Protocol</i> in 2000. In January 2004, CMS made mandatory the use of the <i>Interim Procedural Guidance</i> as the method for federal waiver review. The <i>Guidance</i> requires CMS staff to solicit evidence from the states as to their quality management strategy and implementation, including evidence that the statutory and regulatory assurance have been met. CMS is also revising the voluntary waiver application template and the annual report form (“372 form”) to gather additional information about how states assure and improve quality.</p> |

## Note of caution: The “flexibility” catch-22

The cornerstone of the HCBS waiver – state flexibility – is also its catch 22 for participants. Every 3-5 years a state has the option to renew, not renew, or change the terms of its waiver program. HCBS services must be delivered pursuant to the development of a plan of care and based upon assessed individual needs. However, because the HCBS program is an optional benefit and states have the flexibility to determine the service package, number of persons to be served, target group, etc., a participant may find themselves cut from the program or with a different mix of services than in prior years. In Mississippi, for example, an approved waiver resulted in 48,000 people being cut from the waiver program. In nearly every state, Governors are considering changes to the Medicaid program.

There is no question that the HCBS waiver program has allowed thousands of individuals to be adequately served in community-based settings. The residents remaining in our nation’s ICFs/MR, however, are the most fragile and most in need of consistent, high quality, services. When considering the waiver option, individuals, families and guardians are cautioned to weigh the benefits with the costs. **V**